

I. Overview

The end of a century of so much war and turmoil offers great potential for advancing the human condition. As the world approaches a new millennium, the movement toward economically and politically free societies is advancing steadily. But for many, economic and political freedom is contingent on simple survival. Hundreds of millions of people—including many of those least able to cope with crisis—suffer from *natural disasters*, *man-made disasters*, and *complex emergencies*.

In 1998, those three types of humanitarian crises affected an estimated 418 million people worldwide. Natural and man-made disasters affected 315 million people in 1998, while complex emergencies (disasters complicated by civil strife) touched the lives of 103 million more.¹ The number of affected people requiring USAID's emergency assistance rose from 41 million people in 1997 to 141 million in 1998. In 1998, the Agency responded to 87 declared disasters—65 of them natural disasters, compared with 27 the previous year. Several of the major emergencies were associated with weather anomalies related to the El Niño phenomenon and a more recent related discovery, the Southern Oscillation. The economic impact of those 1997–98 events is estimated at \$33.2 billion worldwide. These disasters affected virtually every development sector and touched nearly every aspect of USAID's portfolio.²

USAID was also called on to help in complex emergencies, situations of civil strife, and postconflict repercussions. Although there were more natural disasters than complex emergencies in 1998, most funding was devoted to

complex emergencies, primarily in Africa. The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative documented conflict as a major cause of increased food insecurity in that region and the cycles of steadily increasing need for food aid. In Latin America, significant strides in shifting from dictatorship to democratic governance were made through postconflict programs. Thirty-four countries in Latin America and the Caribbean now have democratically elected heads of government.³ In Europe and Eurasia, ongoing complex emergencies in Bosnia accounted for a significant share of humanitarian assistance.⁴ USAID's complex emergency programs emphasizing community rehabilitation and economic stabilization provided essential food aid, health, water, and sanitation. In Asia and the Near East, USAID has played a critical role in supporting peaceful transitions.

Natural disasters, such as Hurricanes Mitch and Georges and the El Niño phenomenon, have affected the economic growth rates of many countries. Hurricane Mitch alone—the so-called hurricane of the century—affected 2.3 million people. It caused more than \$5 billion in damage and drove down the annual GDP growth rates of Honduras and Nicaragua by several percentage points.

Since the fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan was drafted, prevention has become a crosscutting theme of the Agency. It has been dropped from the humanitarian assistance goal area. The four APP performance goals are unchanged, but the relevant indicators have been revised to facilitate analysis.

6

Strategic Goal 6:

Promote Humanitarian Assistance

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) identified four priority countries in fiscal year 1998: Bosnia–Herzegovina, Honduras, Indonesia, and Nigeria. In Bosnia, its support to media has played a significant role in moderating hard-line sentiments, helping create a calmer political environment. In Honduras, OTI concentrates on maximum participation of beneficiaries, local organiza-

tions, and other donors. In Indonesia, the office's programs aim to strengthen media, improve civil–military relations, and build capacity within civil society (particularly for change agents). In Nigeria, the OTI program addresses building capacity for good governance, conflict resolution, economic reform, and civil–military relations.

Benefits to the American Public


USAID's work in humanitarian assistance reflects fundamental values and ideals concerning saving lives, reducing suffering, protecting health, and advancing peaceful change. The United States has a long and generous tradition of providing assistance to the victims of disasters, especially women and children. Humanitarian assistance seeks primarily to save lives and reduce suffering. Although it is not a substitute for long-term development programs, it can safeguard investments in economic and social development. Small U.S. investments in crisis prevention and mitigation reduce the need for more substantial investments in crisis resolution where U.S. interests are directly at risk. There is a growing understanding among policymakers of the role humanitarian assistance plays in furthering U.S. interests in peaceful transition and development. Policymakers also appreciate the direct economic benefit to the American public as exemplified by the Title II Public Law 480 food aid program, which provides for the use of surplus U.S. food commodities. This program has spurred the development of markets for U.S. agricultural products worldwide.

USAID coordinates its humanitarian assistance programs with the Depart-


Figure 6.1. USAID-Managed Funds by Strategic Goal
Promote Humanitarian Assistance

All Accounts	Fiscal Year 1998		Fiscal Year 1999	
	\$US millions	Percent of total	\$US millions	Percent of total
Development Assistance	—	—	—	—
New Obligation Authority	—	—	—	—
Carryover/recoveries	—	—	—	—
Economic Support Funds	—	—	—	—
New Obligation Authority	—	—	—	—
Carryover/recoveries	—	—	—	—
SEED	—	—	—	—
New Obligation Authority	—	—	—	—
Carryover/recoveries	—	—	—	—
NIS	—	—	—	—
New Obligation Authority	—	—	—	—
Carryover/recoveries	—	—	—	—
IDA	190	28	200	48
PL 480	502	72	219	52
Total	692	—	419	—

Fiscal Year 1998



Fiscal Year 1999



ments of Agriculture, Defense, and State, nongovernmental donors, and

other U.S. government agencies throughout the national security and foreign policy communities.

Table 6.1. Involvement of Other Donors and U.S. Government Agencies

Major Donors	Agency Objective 6.1 <i>Prevention</i> Potential impact of humanitarian crisis reduced	Agency Objective 6.2 <i>Relief</i> Urgent needs met in crisis situations	Agency Objective 6.3 <i>Transition</i> Security established and basic institutions functioning to meet critical needs and basic rights
International Organizations and Bilateral Donors			
Canada	X	X	X
Denmark		X	X
European Union	X	X	X
Germany	X		
Irish AID		X	X
Japan		X	X
Netherlands	X	X	X
Sweden	X	X	X
UNICEF		X	X
United Kingdom	X	X	X
World Bank	X	X	X
World Food Program	X	X	X
Private Foundations			
Soros			X
U.S. Agencies			
Agriculture		X	X
Commerce			X
Defense	X	X	X
EPA			X
FEMA		X	
International Comm. of Red Cross	X	X	X
IFRC(Red Cross, Red Crescent)	X	X	
International Org. of Migration	X	X	
State/USIA	X	X	X
Treasury			X
UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs	X	X	X
UN High Commission for Refugees	X	X	
UN Off. for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	X	X	X
World Health Organization	X	X	X

Involvement of Other Donors and U.S. Government Agencies

USAID has led the effort to involve other donors in humanitarian assistance efforts and served as a focal point for other U.S. government agencies. We remain the largest bilateral donor in humanitarian assistance. Contributions from the donor community are coordinated with governments in host coun-

tries and use the expertise of government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in designing and implementing their program. NGOs play an important role in implementing USAID programs.

Table 6.1 shows the areas where involvement of other donors and U.S. government agencies intersect with USAID's primary interest in the humanitarian assistance sector.

II. USAID Strategies And Program Performance

USAID's humanitarian assistance addresses three broad categories: natural disasters, man-made disasters, and complex emergencies. *Natural disasters* are caused by physical hazards such as drought, earthquake, fire, flood, and outbreak of pests and disease. *Man-made disasters* are caused by human error in design, implementation, operation, or management, such as a building collapse, industrial accidents, or unsound legal and policy regimes. *Complex emergencies* may include natural disasters, such as droughts, but are frequently

caused or complicated by civil strife. They are manifested in hunger, injury, armed conflict, displaced populations, and death.

The Agency's goal is to save lives, reduce suffering, and reestablish conditions necessary for political and economic development. Its objectives under this goal are *prevention* (6.1), *relief* (6.2), and *transition* (6.3).

Humanitarian assistance improves the capacity of countries to plan and prepare for disasters, mitigate their effects, and respond when disaster strikes (prevention). The Agency provides essential food, shelter, and water to keep thousands of people alive during disasters (relief). Effective preparedness along with early warning and disaster mitigation systems help lessen the impact of disasters and improve the ability of countries to cope with crisis (transition). In addition, USAID supports longer term rehabilitation and recovery for countries in transition, emerging from complex emergencies. These activities emphasize the special needs of countries emerging from crises



caused by political and ethnic strife. Helping societies and governments shift from emergency relief to reestablishing political and social stability is an important component of the Agency's humanitarian assistance. Examples: Demobilizing ex-combatants and removing land mines enhances local security; strengthening local governance and institutions promotes reconciliation and helps reintegrate societies; rebuilding physical and social infrastructure, such as the capacity to rehabilitate victims of torture, integrates relief with transitional and development assistance.

The past year has witnessed experimentation within the Agency and with our development partners in new analytic and programmatic approaches for providing assistance in a more timely and effective manner and working in conflict and postconflict transitions. The following section summarizes USAID's humanitarian assistance programs implemented in 1998.

Agency Objective 1 (Prevention): Increase Emphasis On USAID's Role In Preventing Conflict

Policy guidance developed. A redrafted statement by the USAID Administrator providing policy guidance on conflict prevention was cabled to all missions and diplomatic posts. USAID's Africa Bureau is putting into operation policies to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict by encouraging each post to analyze conflict risk and recommend measures to directly address these vulnerabilities through USAID and other U.S. government programs.

Vulnerabilities identified: translating analysis into strategies and programs. Failure to incorporate analysis of a country's political or economic situation has led to missed opportunities to include millions of citizens in dynamic transitions. For example, **Angola's** transition process has failed primarily because of the international community's endorsement of a winner-take-all electoral and parliamentary system. **Liberia** shows troublesome signs and the possibility of a return to conflict if targeted support is not continued.

Agency pilot countries selected. USAID and the State Department have made progress in selecting Agency pilot countries in Africa, Europe and Eurasia, and Asia and the Near East. In Africa, we are reasonably on track. **Ethiopia, Guinea, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe** are in differing stages of development. The newly proposed Zimbabwe strategy was recently reviewed favorably in USAID/Washington. The discussion brought attention to the potential crisis in the country and to what the Agency can contribute to minimizing the risk of a major societal breakdown. Despite the war in **Ethiopia**, efforts are continuing with the mission proposing to work on prevention in the southern tier. In Europe and Eurasia, the mission in **Georgia** has undertaken its own analysis of conflict with some USAID/Washington assistance. In Asia and the Near East, **Nepal** was chosen recently as the pilot country, and analysis of the root causes of conflict was included during the framework-setting exercise. The Office of Transition Initiatives and the Global Center for Democracy and Good Governance, among other USAID offices, are assisting Agency missions with conflict prevention frameworks and analysis.

Failure to incorporate analysis of a country's political or economic situation has led to missed opportunities to include millions of citizens in dynamic transitions. For example, Angola's transition process has failed primarily because of the international community's endorsement of a winner-take-all electoral and parliamentary system.

We have agreed to establish a working group to develop a systematic information exchange. We have also agreed to initiate a joint-donor pilot effort in up to 10 countries on peace building and conflict prevention to improve operational effectiveness.

Donor efforts on conflict prevention enhanced. Conflict prevention was one of the six themes for the May 1999 high-level U.S.–European Commission consultations. Those talks proved an excellent opportunity to proceed on policy coherence and exchanges at the technical level. We have agreed to establish a working group to develop a systematic information exchange. We have also agreed to initiate a joint-donor pilot effort in up to 10 countries on peace building and conflict prevention to improve operational effectiveness. We are collaborating with the Carnegie Institute on a new paper on the role of development cooperation in conflict prevention. The German government has sponsored the inclusion of conflict prevention and the role of development cooperation on the G–8 agenda. The issue was to be addressed in a meeting at the end of 1999 in Berlin.

Training planned. To heighten awareness and preparation of field staff, we will introduce a conflict-prevention module for training USAID new entrants and the Reaching for Results reengineering course. We have collaborated with the State Department Foreign Service Institute’s political training director to improve the department’s interagency course on conflict prevention.

Agency approach refocused. In fiscal year 1999, conflict prevention was moved from simply a humanitarian assistance goal to a crosscutting issue across all of the Agency’s sectors.

There was concern that addressing crisis prevention or mitigation as a separate objective—particularly for man-made

(complex) crises—did not fit well under the humanitarian assistance framework. Because crises tend to be cyclical, and because it remains difficult to demonstrate the direct effect of USAID programs in conflict prevention (that is, prove a negative), having a separate prevention objective as part of the framework made it confusing to report separately on results. After a series of consultations within the Agency and elsewhere in the government, the Administrator chose a modest proposal to improve USAID internal prevention performance in relation to economic crises, political chaos, and complex emergencies and deadly conflict by taking five steps:

1. Require more objective analysis of root causes of and vulnerability to conflict, as part of the country strategic planning process and country teams’ preparations on mission performance plans
2. Restate Agency conflict-prevention policy and reissue policy guidance on conflict as part of the mission performance plan
3. Develop a set of conflict-prevention frameworks, applications, and tools, and distribute them to the field
4. Review country strategic plans in USAID/Washington more critically to ensure that strategies help prevent conflict
5. Ensure that appropriate development assistance and tools are applied during strategy implementation

Agency Objective 2 (Relief): Direct Aid and Donor Coordination

Direct Aid Meets Critical Food Needs; The United States Is the Largest Food Aid Donor


Through strides made in performance monitoring, USAID's Title II emergency food aid program is able to determine that it reached over 77 percent of the total 21.3 million beneficiaries targeted by the program in fiscal year 1998. Implemented primarily by U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and the World Food Program, the Title II emergency food aid program reached at least 16.4 million beneficiaries. This represents an increase of 42 percent in the number reached through Title II emergency food aid from the previous year. USAID in 1998 provided 921,350 metric tons of food aid, valued at over \$481 million, to more than 22 countries. In addition, USAID supported the World Food Program's Protracted Relief Operations in 12 countries, contributing 217,120 metric tons of food commodities valued at more than \$116 million. This represents 41 percent of the total tonnage (and 36 percent of the total value) mobilized by World Food Program from all donors for its worldwide operation in 1998.

As part of the Agency's efforts to measure progress toward its goals and to quantify the impact of programs on people, Title II emergency aid programs seek to maintain and improve the nutritional status of beneficiaries. In this regard, the quality of reporting by

programs on how food aid affects the nutritional status of beneficiaries improved significantly in 1998.⁵ More than half of all Title II food aid programs reported maintaining or improving nutritional status of beneficiaries. For example, one private voluntary organization program in **Sudan** reported that the malnutrition rate among children under 5 dropped from more than 40 percent to 12 percent in seven months in the project area. The Title II program has led USAID's efforts to reach the U.S. government's foreign policy goal of maintaining the nutritional status of children living in regions affected by humanitarian emergencies and to report on the Agency goal area indicator on nutrition (performance goal 2). Because of the known relationship between nutrition and mortality, this accomplishment will help reduce abnormally high death rates in refugee populations (performance goal 1). (A later section discusses these performance goal indicators.)

Besides providing emergency food needs, the Agency provides other critical needs in health, sanitation, shelter, and water. In 1998 the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) responded to 87 declared disasters, 65 of them natural disasters.⁶ This was a significant

**Figure 6.2. Number of Beneficiaries
Of Title II Emergency Food Aid (millions)**



Preventive action taken by Brazil and other countries resulted in the production of bumper crops—despite the forest fires brought on by drought in a period when rainfall was 23 percent below normal.

increase from fiscal year 1997, when the office responded to 48 officially declared disasters, 27 of them natural. The most destructive natural disasters were hurricanes. In September 1998, Hurricane Georges swept across the **Dominican Republic**, claiming hundreds of lives and displacing thousands of people. Critical shortages of food, water, and shelter occurred in poor urban neighborhoods and rural areas throughout the country. Malaria, cholera, dengue, conjunctivitis, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections became potential health problems. OFDA supported the Pan American Health Organization's appeal for emergency assistance to meet hurricane victims' health needs and worked with the Peace Corps to deliver food to displaced persons. In addition, the office provided water tanks, water purification supplies, and generators to power small municipal water pumps. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch hit **Central America**. The relief effort will be reported on in the next Agency Performance Report.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance anticipated the effects and reduced the impact of disasters on victims, in partnership with agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the World Bank. The partnerships led to the foundation of the International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, a NOAA-funded consortium of two universities that provided operational regional seasonal climate forecasts worldwide through the 1997–98 El Niño Southern Oscillation. Preventive action taken by **Brazil** and other countries resulted in the production of bumper crops—despite the forest fires brought on by drought in a period when rainfall was 23 percent below normal. Improved climate forecasting

has been used by health officials in **South America** to take steps to reduce the number of malaria and dengue fever cases arising from the increased moisture associated with El Niño. President Clinton heralded USAID's collaboration with NOAA at the April 1998 Summit of the Americas when he announced a bilateral agreement between the United States and **Chile** to launch a Pan-American Climate Information System.⁷

In Latin America, the El Niño Southern Oscillation drought brought fires in **Brazil**. USAID and its partners responded quickly with relief assistance. A congressional hearing that highlighted areas of high fire risk led to a broad-based mobilization effort against accidental fire and a presidential decree that included Agency-sponsored, community-based fire control measures. USAID coordinated an interagency working group response to the 1998 Amazon fires and helped train 120,000 Amazonians in fire management. The Agency was the only international donor in **Brazil** to respond with fire mobilization resources during the severe 1998 fire season.

USAID continues to deal with the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch. To support economic and social recovery and improve resiliency throughout Latin America, the U.S. government is emphasizing environmental protection and natural disaster mitigation as integral elements of post-Mitch reconstruction.⁸

In Europe and Eurasia, as violent conflict began growing in **Kosovo**, the degree of humanitarian emergency escalated. Fighting began in late February 1998, set off by a series of clashes between Serbian security forces and members of the Kosovo Liberation

Army, an ethnic Albanian group fighting for an independent Kosovo. As a consequence of the fighting, thousands of Kosovar Albanians were displaced from their homes and fled into neighboring **Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro**. In August, USAID developed a winter emergency program for refugees and internally displaced persons as the conflict continued to escalate. The Agency then proceeded to meet primary humanitarian needs: food, shelter, emergency health care, winterization assistance, and water and sanitation assistance. By the end of fiscal year 1998, it became clear that the Kosovo situation would only worsen in FY99, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons would eventually exceed a million.

The terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in **Kenya** and **Tanzania** in August 1998 killed 247 people, including 12 U.S. citizens and 32 foreign service nationals. Nearly 5,000 people were injured. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance responded by quickly providing medical supplies and deploying the U.S. Urban Search and Rescue team from the Fairfax County, Va., Fire and Rescue Department to coordinate U.S. search and rescue efforts. OFDA provided more than \$2.4 million for the effort and transported a team from the Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Department from Florida to Washington to help coordinate response efforts. OFDA collaborated with various government groups, UNICEF, and several nongovernmental organizations that provided medical and home- and community-based assistance to survivors and families. Efforts were also coordinated with other donors such as the World Bank, the German and British governments, and the World Food Program—the last of which delivered

emergency medical supplies provided by the World Health Organization.

Improving Coordination Within and Without USAID

USAID has made progress in coordinating with other donors. For example, under a pact known as the Transatlantic Agenda, the Agency is committed to meet regularly with the European Union at the working level on humanitarian assistance planning. USAID will assign an EU humanitarian assistance liaison in Brussels. This will ensure better coherence and adequacy of emergency response between the two largest donors of humanitarian assistance. The Agency expanded its coordinating network through joint meetings, information sharing, and collaboratively funded activities.

The Agency is also making progress persuading other donors and organizations to increase contributions to humanitarian assistance programs. This includes support to countries transitioning from complex crises. The Agency is working in **Angola** with the European Commission Humanitarian Office on collaborative funding of activities. In **Sierra Leone**, ECHO and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance cofund several humanitarian programs through private voluntary organizations or NGOs. The Office of Food for Peace collaborates with the World Food Program on joint-sponsored food aid activities worldwide.

USAID has established a closer working relationship with United Nations agencies involved in health and nutrition—particularly with the World Health Organization, the World Food Program, and the UN Administrative Coordinating Committee subcommittee

USAID will assign an EU humanitarian assistance liaison in Brussels. This will ensure better coherence and adequacy of emergency response between the two largest donors of humanitarian assistance.

on nutrition. The last group, the ACC/SCN, is a coordinating mechanism for exchange of information and technical guidance. The Agency is collaborating with ACC/SCN's Refugee Nutrition Information System and the Health Information Network for Advanced Planning (HINAP) to monitor the performance goals on crude mortality rate and nutritional status of children under 5 in complex emergencies. Established in 1998, HINAP is a joint project of the World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It provides health and related information for planning in advance of mass population displacements attributable to complex emergencies. It also monitors evolving emergencies for better response. HINAP is a partnership between organizations (NGOs, the UN, international organizations, and donor and host governments) involved in complex emergencies.

In addition to the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are involved in USAID's goal monitoring by sharing their databases and assisting in the selection of pilot sites and countries. UNICEF emergency programs will explore possibilities where the collection of crude mortality rates can be linked with ongoing data gathering on nutrition. Currently, UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, which is being undertaken in 60 countries, includes data on crude mortality rates and nutritional status at the national level.

USAID worked closely with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Program for the quick release of humanitarian rations to meet

critical food needs of internally displaced persons and refugees in **Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro.**

The Agency supports the Health Information Network for Advanced Planning and the Refugee Nutrition Information System to access proactive and updated information on health, nutrition, and other factors affecting populations in emergency situations. Timely provision of vital health, nutrition, and other data to the Agency and its implementers is improving program design, monitoring, and targeting of humanitarian assistance programs to the most vulnerable groups. During the early days of the **Kosovo** crisis, private voluntary organizations were provided critical information through regular e-mail. For the first time, World Health Organization health data went to implementers in the field instantly. Thanks to satellite telephones, some PVOs had access to e-mail in their tents in the refugee camps. This marked significant progress from past emergencies, particularly from the 1994 Rwanda crisis.

Coordination with other U.S. government agencies (notably the national security community) is increasingly close in planning and implementing humanitarian assistance. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (on managing complex contingency operations) recognizes that effective response to complex emergencies requires multidimensional operations with diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, security, and economic assistance components. Coordination has increased on operational issues with several U.S. agencies (such as the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration), with efforts

being made to develop common performance indicators for humanitarian assistance.

USAID works closely with the Department of Agriculture to improve the nutritional quality and monitoring of Title II food commodities, such as vegetable oil. The USDA announced, effective 1 December 1998, that all Title II refined vegetable oil would be fortified with vitamin A. The United States donates about 145,000 metric tons of vegetable oil per year under the Title II program. The oil reaches 20 million people in more than 40 countries.

Coordination is also closer with Agency missions that have been encouraged to integrate transition and food security programs into their portfolios. As a result, a number of missions have shifted program priorities to prevention and mitigation of natural and man-made disasters. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has strengthened collaborative working relationships with USAID missions and the U.S. military.

Although efforts have been made to improve U.S. government and donor coordination, many challenges remain. One is to find better ways to coordinate Title II food deliveries with the World Food Program. USAID's Bureau for **Latin America and the Caribbean** and Center for Development Information and Evaluation are conducting an evaluation of relief efforts after Hurricane Mitch.

U.S. policy objectives and the supporting role and use of humanitarian assistance programs must be defined early during an emergency and be based on thorough political, economic, and military

analysis. As was the case in **Rwanda** and in other complex political emergencies, combatant groups can manipulate humanitarian assistance to support their own political and military objectives and purposes. USAID and the rest of the U.S. government need to recognize this early and deliver clear, objective, timely analysis of the situations. The analysis is essential to support the development of integrated and coherent policy options and decisions for the design of appropriate programs and resource allocation. A more streamlined interagency decision-making structure is required to define objectives, roles, and responsibilities. Such streamlining will help ensure that policy and programs work in harmony and humanitarian assistance is not politicized.

USAID continues to rely on PVOs and NGOs to implement its humanitarian response as they respond to changing situations. Such partners are logical, low-cost links to local groups generating broad-based community participation.

Agency Objective 3 (Transition): Ensure That Common Elements Form the Core Of USAID's Strategy in Postconflict Transitions

USAID advances peaceful, democratic changes in conflict-prone countries of strategic importance and humanitarian concern to the United States. The Agency *responds creatively to transition opportunities* around the world and translates those experiences into policy options and technical expertise for wider use.

As was the case in Rwanda and in other complex political emergencies, combatant groups can manipulate humanitarian assistance to support their own political and military objectives and purposes. USAID and the rest of the U.S. government need to recognize this early and deliver clear, objective, timely analysis of the situations.

Lessons learned from these experiences worldwide are incorporated into the framework and in Agency postconflict transition programs to anticipate and mitigate potential conflict. Humanitarian assistance programs effectively mitigated economic and social crises in Bosnia and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998.

The Office of Transition Initiatives developed new mechanisms and procedures, such as Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (better known as Swift), to respond quickly and effectively to opportunities and crises worldwide. OTI is able to establish a presence for new country programs, with communications, security, and administrative and logistic support for rapid assessments. Such activities have been integrated into mission strategic frameworks.

OTI has provided additional support to USAID missions in several areas:

- 1) analyzing and developing program tools to address specific transition issues;
- 2) pilot-testing new approaches, including support for a wide range of “change agents” in a society;
- 3) providing sector expertise, including media in the **Balkans**, especially in the former **Yugoslavia** and demobilization/reintegration of ex-combatants to support the peace accords in **Guatemala**;
- 4) concentrating economic growth programs in secondary cities to alleviate war-related migration to the capital and reduce the potential for future conflict (such as in **Haiti** and **Peru**);
- 5) providing fast assistance, allowing for eventual establishment of longer term programs or reorientation of existing programs in response to changed conditions; and
- 6) using regional platforms and hubs with access to areas outside capital cities (such as beyond Kinshasa, in the **Democratic Republic of Congo**).⁹

OTI is one of several USAID organizations that address different elements of postconflict situations. The Agency has a high priority on developing postconflict programs that lead to effective transitions and to sustainable posttransition growth.

USAID’s Global Center for Democracy and Good Governance and the Office of Transition Initiatives have worked jointly with the regional bureaus and their missions to promote peaceful postconflict political, economic, and social transitions—often by mitigating crises that could lead a country or region to war.

The Global Center for Democracy and Good Governance developed a *strategic assessment framework* for countries in postconflict transition or crisis. It includes a range of program options, such as justice sector reform, support for citizens’ advocacy efforts, and technical assistance for strengthening fragile institutions to implement transition strategies. These strategies and programs complement OTI’s work advancing peaceful democratic change by building rapid-response activities that meet citizens’ most urgent needs. Lessons learned from these experiences worldwide are incorporated into the framework and in Agency postconflict transition programs to anticipate and mitigate potential conflict.

For example, while *conflict prevention* is the main objective in unstable environments, conflict-prevention strategies as such (for example, the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative) have had limited impact. In contrast, *humanitarian assistance programs* (such as OTI’s approach to removing obstacles to meeting critical citizen needs) effectively mitigated economic and social crises in **Bosnia** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo** in 1998.

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, the Agency has made significant strides over the past two decades in

dealing with *shifts from dictatorship to democratic governance*. Thirty-four LAC countries now have democratically elected heads of government. For the first time, transitions of power from one democratically elected government to another take place in credible and successful elections. The number of human rights violations has fallen, and momentum is growing toward building inclusive, democratic institutions. The Agency has contributed significantly to these efforts.

In **Guatemala** the U.S. government and other donors pledged \$1.9 billion over four years (1997–2000) to support implementation of the historic peace accords signed in December 1996. In **Nicaragua**, USAID's postconflict strategy of promoting broad-based sustainable development appears to be working, with several positive developments. They include 1) a projected 6 percent increase in GDP this past year (owing in part to the mandated reconstruction expenditures following from Hurricanes Georges and Mitch), 2) an ease in inflation, 3) resolution of confiscated-property cases for 1,750 U.S. citizens, 4) a decline in infant mortality and fertility rates, and 5) increased transparency in government management of the public sector as shown by a rise in primary school completion rates. The war-to-peace program in **El Salvador** left a legacy of good work that serves as a model for the same program in Guatemala.

In **Africa**, programs are performing well, given the changing context. USAID made progress in *rehabilitating communities*, after civil war left countries and infrastructures in ruins. In **Liberia**, although there are concerns about a return to conflict in the future, security

remained relatively stable throughout 1998, allowing large numbers of internally displaced populations and refugees to resettle in their towns and villages of origin. Agriculture rehabilitation efforts continue to go well. Distribution of seeds and assorted farming tools has led to expansion in rice-cultivated areas and contributed significantly to the recovery of the 1998 harvest. Food-for-work rations provided incentives for community rehabilitation activities that led to the repair of bridges, schools, clinics, and farm-to-market and feeder roads. War-affected youths attended vocational training schools with more than 52 percent of enrolled students graduating (though only 25 percent found employment right away). The potential for a return to conflict continues but, during the review period, it was successfully avoided.

In **Uganda**, transitional activities were undertaken to increase food production, improve access to markets, and enhance farmers' local capacity. Activities included creating farmers associations and marketing nontraditional cash crops by strengthening marketing links and systems. These led to a marked increase in one remote community in yields, food production, and food security at the household level. More than 1,700 households adopted improved agricultural practices. As a result, beneficiaries increased their amount of disposable income, and a total of \$140,000 was injected into the local rural economy.¹⁰

In southern **Sudan**, the Agency supported an intervention that increased local agricultural production and promoted the marketing of surplus to NGOs. By the end of fiscal year 1998, USAID-funded NGOs had helped revive livelihoods for 100,000 Sudanese

In fiscal year 1998, 10 Agency missions and 2 nonpresence countries in Africa reported that their programs were directly affected by internal or external conflict. Nine missions said they were operating in countries with the potential for conflict, and only eight missions did not report that conflict was an issue.

and met basic food needs of refugees—the displaced populations that received the surpluses.¹¹

The Bureau for Africa has made significant strides in developing strategic programs that support postconflict transitions and mitigate dangerous crises. In fiscal year 1998, 10 Agency missions and 2 nonpresence countries in **Africa** reported that their programs were directly affected by internal or external conflict. Nine missions said they were operating in countries with the potential for conflict, and only eight missions did not report that conflict was an issue.

To share information and lessons learned, Africa Bureau launched the Conflict Web site in late spring 1999, as an interactive tool linking Agency resources and providing links to other sites. That spawned the Agency's intranet site. In fiscal year 1998, conflict prevention and mitigation was the key factor in Africa Bureau's decision to fund an organization known as Accord. An indigenous organization based in **South Africa**, Accord works on (in the words of many Africans) "African solutions to African problems."

Almost every country in **Asia and the Near East** with a democracy and governance strategic objective channels resources to local NGOs to strengthen its analytic and outreach capacities. The trend now seems clear: after years of USAID assistance, many of these organizations have become effective advocates for policy and institutional reform. In the **West Bank–Gaza**, NGOs have succeeded in getting a law passed to govern NGO operations, thus

ensuring a more open environment for the debate of public policy issues. The law is widely considered the most progressive of its kind in the Middle East.

In **Cambodia**, where legislative restrictions prevent us from working with the government, USAID-supported coalitions for human rights and legal-aid NGOs have attained the advocacy and outreach skills necessary to ensure they can guard against human rights abuses.

The effect of the Kosovo conflict echoes throughout **Europe and Eurasia**. It is a prime argument for the utility of conflict prevention over postconflict rehabilitation. To ensure a durable peace, vital to the stability of this volatile region, the United States, the European Union, and other donors are promoting a strategy of regional cooperation and integration for southeast Europe. Nearly a decade into USAID programs in Europe and Eurasia (but before the Kosovo crisis), the bureau initiated a review of the strategies and assumptions underlying its programs. It concluded that new approaches to complete the transition across the region might be necessary. The original assumption—that a quick in-and-out strategy would work with all the formerly communist countries—has been reassessed, and the bureau's strategy is being reoriented accordingly. In addition, the E&E Bureau is finding ways to support conflict prevention in country strategies and is increasing its ability to identify and monitor indicators of vulnerability to crisis.

III. Agency Objectives By Operating Unit and Region

Table 6.2 shows field-based operating units with strategic objectives during fiscal year 1998 that supported the humanitarian assistance goal and

Agency objectives. More than half of the Agency's humanitarian assistance objectives were in **Africa**.

Table 6.2. Agency Objectives by Operating Unit and Region

	Africa	ANE	E&E	LAC	Total
Total field-based operating units	29	16	25	17	87
Total with humanitarian assistance objectives	11	2	6	1	20
Prevention	7	0	2	0	9
Relief	7	1	3	0	11
Postconflict transitions	5	1	6	1	13

Note: This table shows field-based operating units with strategic objectives in support of the humanitarian assistance goal and Agency objectives. Operating units may have more than one humanitarian assistance strategic objective. In addition, some of the operating units' strategic objectives support more than one Agency goal or objective. See annex B for details on distribution of programs in field-based operating units.

IV. Performance by Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan

In fiscal year 1998, USAID and its partners implemented a range of programs to achieve the humanitarian assistance goal, abbreviated as *prevention*, *relief*, and *transition*. As anticipated in the 1999 Annual Performance Plan, the Agency had difficulty measuring performance in humanitarian assistance against selected indicators and targets. After ongoing consultations over the past year, the Agency arrived at an agreed-upon methodology and process related to indicators for Agency objective 2, *relief*, and a definition related to Agency objective 3, *postconflict* and *postdisaster transitions*.

Conflict prevention, Agency objective 1, was dropped as a humanitarian assistance goal, as it is difficult to demonstrate the direct effect of USAID programs in this area. But conflict prevention activities will be integrated within the Agency, as part of the strategic planning and results reporting process by all operating units where conflict represents a major impediment to achieving or sustaining economic growth and development.

A review of the humanitarian assistance portfolio shows that the Agency has increased its concentration on complex

emergencies and postconflict transitions. A trend toward more politically oriented issues—and away from USAID’s more traditional emphasis on humanitarian assistance and sustainable development—has been recognized. The Agency seeks to balance renewed emphasis on maintaining its commitment to long-term development with the analysis needed to mitigate or prevent crisis and conflict.

Humanitarian emergencies are increasing in number and complexity. Trend analyses indicate the high probability of a decade of superdisasters.¹² USAID and the donor community need to give special attention to anticipating, mitigating, and responding to crises. Specifically, coordination among organizations such as those described in section II of this chapter needs to be improved to meet the increasing challenge.

PERFORMANCE GOAL 1: CRUDE MORTALITY RATE FOR REFUGEE POPULATIONS RETURNED TO NORMAL RANGE WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF ONSET OF AN EMERGENCY

USAID monitors crude mortality rate (see table 6.3) with help from the World Health Organization’s joint project (Health Information Network for Advanced Planning) with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Crude mortality rate data are analyzed

with data on the nutritional status of children under 5 in the same pilot sites, as nutritional status has a close correlation with mortality rates.¹³

High levels of acute malnutrition (wasting) are a good predictor of

Performance Table From Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan

Table 6.3. Performance Goal 1: Crude Mortality Rate for Refugee Populations Returned to Normal Range Within Six Months of Onset of the Emergency Situation

Indicator: Crude mortality rate in emergency situations.

Sources: World Health Organization, U.S. Census Bureau, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

		APP Baseline(1)	Latest Actual (2)	Target (3) 1999
Agency Level	planned			20.0
	actual	n/a	n/a	

Note: Data are not available to complete the performance table. Revisions were made in how the indicator is defined and will be measured. That altered the baseline and targets. Revisions were made to facilitate the measurement and monitoring of this indicator because data are available only for pilot emergency sites. Crude mortality rate provides an overall indicator of the overall status of affected populations in emergencies. It indicates the current health status of a population and provides a baseline against which the effectiveness of relief programs can be assessed. A crude mortality rate exceeding 1 per 10,000 a day signifies a “very serious emergency.”

1. and 2. Revisions were made in 1998 in defining the indicator, how it will be measured, and how the baseline will be established. Therefore, the planned 1999 target is no longer relevant.

3. See fiscal year 2001 Annual Performance Plan for new definition, target, and selected pilot sites for monitoring.

elevated mortality. Going by the Administrative Coordinating Committee subcommittee on nutrition's most recent data from 1994 through 1997, levels of wasting above 10 percent indicate elevated mortality (1 death per 10,000 people per day). Pilot sites for monitoring crude mortality rate and the nutritional status of children were selected on the basis of data availability. Six sites were selected in four countries: **Angola, Kenya, Nepal, and Sudan**. Since U.S. private voluntary organizations still must gain expertise to collect crude mortality rates, data for monitoring this performance goal are drawn from other sources. They reflect performance and activities of donors other than USAID. Additional emergency sites in **Burundi** and **Somalia**—each of which receives a major share of USAID's humanitarian assistance—will be added, as data become available.

Performance Analysis

There are no planned-versus-actual data to report. As defined in the fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan, the original indicator implied (erroneously) that measurement tools and data sources existed to determine the global proportion of acute malnutrition in children under 59 months in emergency situations. In 1998, once the unfeasibility of this measure became apparent, USAID held extensive consultations with collaborating agencies. The Agency redefined this indicator and is now monitoring performance at selected emergency sites where crude mortality rate and nutritional status data are available and are likely to be available from the same sources in the future. For this reporting period, the Agency concentrated on establishing a baseline and setting new targets for subsequent monitoring and reporting.

Revisions to the Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan

The fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan introduced the crude mortality rate as a performance goal to measure effective and efficient response in times of emergency. This performance goal is maintained in the FY00 Annual Performance Plan, but with revisions to the indicator's definition, how and where it will be monitored, and sources of data.

Rather than targeting crude mortality rate reduction globally in refugee populations (as was established in the FY99 APP), for which there are insufficient data in the FY00 Annual Performance Plan, the Agency indicated that it could select sites where baseline data are now available—and are likely to be available for future trend analysis from the same sources. These were disaggregated and identified as individual “pilot sites.” Each emergency pilot site will be monitored to ensure that the crude mortality rate decreases, especially within the first six months of an emergency situation, regardless of initial rate.

Crude mortality rates exceeding 1 death per 10,000 people a day signify a “very serious emergency” situation. Analysis of crude mortality rates will be considered with nutritional status of children under 5 in the same pilot sites. This provides context and more accuracy in interpreting data, because of the close correlation between mortality rates and nutritional status. Private voluntary organizations or nongovernmental organizations undertaking USAID-funded programs on nutritional status of children are collecting the data.

USAID has decided that rather than using diverse sources of data to analyze performance, it will use the data analyzed by the Health Information Network for Advanced Planning. USAID has been able to record baseline data for this performance goal, owing to the official working agreement with HINAP using an existing UN mechanism monitoring health and nutrition status of populations in complex emergencies.

Adjustments to Be Included In the Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Performance Plan

A total of six pilot sites in Angola, Kenya, Nepal, and Sudan were selected and included for the FY01 APP. Targets for crude mortality rate were established for each site.

PERFORMANCE GOAL 2: NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF CHILDREN UNDER 5 IN POPULATIONS MADE VULNERABLE BY EMERGENCIES MAINTAINED OR IMPROVED

Performance Analysis

Following extensive consultations with collaborating agencies in 1998, USAID redefined this indicator (see table 6.4) to make it measurable. For this reporting

period, the Agency undertook to establish a baseline and set new targets for subsequent monitoring and reporting. (See discussion under performance goal 1.)

Performance Table From Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan

**Table 6.4. Performance Goal 2: Nutritional Status of Children Under 5
In Populations Made Vulnerable by Emergencies Maintained or Improved**

Indicator: Proportion of children under 59 months who are wasted (weight for height).

Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations.

		APP Baseline(1)	Latest Actual (2)	Target (3) 1999
Agency Level	planned			65.0
	actual	n/a	n/a	

1. Fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan target: Changes were made in defining the indicator, how it will be measured, and how baseline will be established. Therefore, the planned 1999 target is no longer relevant.

2. There are no data to enable USAID to report on this performance goal. Thus, in the Annual Performance Plans for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, revisions were made in how the indicator is defined and will be measured. Baseline and targets have changed accordingly. Revisions were made to facilitate the measurement and monitoring of this indicator because data are available only for pilot emergency sites.

3. See fiscal year 2001 Annual Performance Plan for new definition, target, and selected pilot sites for monitoring.

Revisions to the Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan

The fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan introduced *improving the nutritional status of children (wasting) under 5* as a performance goal. This is continued in the fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan but with revisions to the definition of the indicator, how and where it will be monitored, and sources of data. Rather than assess the global proportion of children under 5 who are wasted¹⁴ in five countries (for which there are no data), the FY00 APP said that nine pilot emergency sites would be selected where baseline data are currently available and likely to remain available for future trend analysis. Each emergency site will be monitored to ensure that acute malnutrition rates stabilize or decline to acceptable levels in emergencies (that is, prevalence is less than 10 percent in children 6 to 59 months). In addition, analysis of nutritional status of children will take place with crude mortality rate in the same pilot sites. This will provide context and better accuracy in interpreting data.

The data source was also changed. Rather than using diverse sources of data for analysis of performance, data on nutrition are compiled and analyzed by the Refugee Nutrition Information System of the UN Administrative Coordinating Committee subcommittee on nutrition. The ACC/SCN helps the UN respond to nutritional problems. The Refugee Nutrition Information System compiles and analyzes nutritional data of refugees and displaced populations from all sources, including USAID-funded programs. This linkage has enabled the Agency to establish baseline data for this performance goal. Nutritional data are analyzed with crude mortality rate data in some pilot sites where both data sets are available.

Adjustments to Be Included In the Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Performance Plan

Nine pilot sites, in **Angola, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Nepal**, and the former **Yugoslavia**, were selected and included in the FY01 APP. The indicator and source were not changed from the FY00 APP.

PERFORMANCE GOAL 3: CONDITIONS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IMPROVED IN CONFLICT, POSTCONFLICT, AND RAPID TRANSITION COUNTRIES

There has been noticeable improvement in reducing internal conflict worldwide. Some of this improvement results from application of conflict-prevention tools by the international community. Conflict-prevention tools are many—diplomacy, military intervention, and trade and economic sanctions. Among them, development assistance is but one

partner. At issue is the lack of a conflict-prevention strategy. The need for such a strategy has been recognized repeatedly (most recently in the Carnegie Commission Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict), but none has been successfully put into effect. The United States, the UN, and others have undertaken several conflict-prevention initiatives that have

failed, in part for lack of leadership and integration of efforts.

Within the development community, the major identified impediments to working effectively on prevention are

- Lack of a clear understanding of the problem and ambiguous terminology
- Lack of understanding of root causes and how development tools can be most productively applied to the problem
- Inability to assess a society's vulnerability to the breakdown of coop-

eration and the resulting erosion of order early enough to allow the effective use of nonmilitary methods of intervention

- No clear policy statement and definition of roles and responsibilities
- Lack of coherent concept, vision, and management system for prevention
- No culture of prevention
- Unwillingness to take preventive action when national sovereignty cloaks potential genocide

Performance Table From Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan

Table 6.5. Performance Goal 3: Conditions for Social and Economic Development Improved in Conflict, Postconflict, and Rapid Transition Countries

Indicator: Number of people displaced by open conflict.

Sources: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Surveys, through 1999.

		APP Baseline(1) 1995	Latest Actual (2) 1998	Target (3) 1999
Agency Level	planned			17,476
	actual	19,875	14,458	
sub-Saharan Africa	planned			7,651
	actual	8,722	4,843	
Asia–Near East	planned			2,615
	actual	3,040	3,197	
Europe–Eurasia	planned			6,286
	actual	6,769	4,008	
Latin America – Caribbean	planned			1,034
	actual	1,344	2,411	

Note: Refugees and internally displaced persons are the direct consequence of crisis and conflict. Increases and decreases in their number are a direct indication of changing trends of open conflict. For this performance goal, the Agency is using the country of origin as the basis for determining the baseline for context indicators.

1. Baseline performance is based on the latest 1995 data from the World Refugee Survey 1996. The baseline was adjusted from the fiscal year 1999 baseline to reflect the current USAID-assisted country list and the exclusion of Palestinians as refugees.

2. Total number of displaced persons in 1998 is based on the World Refugee Survey 1999.

3. The 1999 target was derived by using the same percentage reduction reported in the FY99 APP.

- Inflexible implementation because of earmarked resources

This performance goal (see table 6.5) attempts to capture the social and economic conditions of USAID-assisted countries in conflict or postconflict by measuring the number of refugees and persons displaced by internal conflict. Regionally, in fiscal year 1998, five programs in the Asia and Near East Bureau explicitly linked USAID interventions to conflict prevention: **Indonesia**, Mindanao (**the Philippines**), **Sri Lanka**, the **West Bank–Gaza**, and Forward (Fostering the Resolution of Water Resources Disputes). Most of the programs emphasize the economic dimension of conflict prevention and assume that economic growth is an effective means for reducing tensions.

Performance Analysis


This performance goal provides contextual information for assessing changing trends of open conflict and thus the need for humanitarian assistance in various regions. As noted earlier, it is not a direct measure of USAID performance.

The data source for this performance goal is the U.S. Committee on Refugees' World Refugee Survey. 1998 figures were published in the 1999 edition of that survey.

Figures 6.3a and 6.3b show that the trend in numbers of people displaced by open conflict has decreased since its highest levels in 1992–94. Within USAID-assisted countries, the same trend appears in **sub-Saharan Africa**. The displaced population peaked in 1992.

The major conflicts affecting populations during that year were **Mozambique** and **Somalia**, where displaced persons were estimated at 5 million and 2.8 million, respectively. Those two conflicts, in addition to the 4 million internally displaced persons in **South Africa**, accounted for more than half of the 17 million displaced within current USAID-assisted countries for that year. That number has declined sharply over the past several years. The conflict in Mozambique has been effectively resolved. Somalia's civil war has subsided, but the country still has more than 500,000 displaced persons. The status of South Africa's displaced majority has been erased by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, and the new government continues to enact land reforms. Political violence in the country in 1998 was limited. Reductions have occurred in **Liberia**, **Mali**, and **Namibia**, while the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Eritrea**, and **Rwanda** continue to produce high levels of refugees and displaced persons. **Angola** is still a major concern in 1998, harboring 1.5 million displaced persons.

Figure 6.3a. Persons Displaced By Open Conflict 1990–98 (millions)



Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees

Table 6.5 summarizes the number of displaced people in current USAID-assisted countries. The baseline and target have been adjusted to reflect the current list. For the 1999 target, similar reductions in displaced persons, measured as a percent from the baseline, were recalculated as follows: sub-Saharan Africa, 12 percent; Asia and the Near East, 14 percent; Europe and Eurasia, 7 percent; and Latin America and the Caribbean, 23 percent. (See annex D for the country-level data.)

Achievement Beyond Fiscal Year 1999 Plan Levels

The trend line for USAID-assisted countries in Asia and the Near East is relatively flat. The ANE estimates for the 1995 baseline in the fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan included 3.3 million Palestinian refugees. Owing to political changes in the status of the West Bank and Gaza, these people are not included in the revised baseline. Decreases in the number of displaced

persons in **Sri Lanka** were not enough to offset increases in **Burma** and **India**.


In Europe and Eurasia, the surge in numbers of people displaced by open conflict occurred during 1994–96, directly reflecting the wars in **Bosnia–Herzegovina** and **Chechnya** and the civil conflict in **Tajikistan**. Following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons declined by 47 percent in Bosnia by fiscal year 1998.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the latest estimates for 1998 are twice as high as the original 23 percent decline from the FY99 APP. This increase was attributable primarily to **Colombia's** political violence and human rights abuses. The conflict in Colombia includes the Colombian armed forces, left-wing guerrilla groups, and right-wing paramilitary organizations. Confrontations between these groups increased during 1998, resulting in an estimated 1.4 million displaced persons.

Planned Actions for Unmet Fiscal Year 1999 Targets

Achievements are not within the Agency's manageable interests.

Figure 6.3b. Persons Displaced By Open Conflict 1990–98 (millions)



Revisions to the Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan

Performance goal 3 was restated as *conditions for social and economic development and conflict-prone situations improved*. The indicator was changed from *number of people displaced by open conflict* to *number of conflict-prone countries in which conditions improved for social and economic development*.

Adjustments to Be Included in the Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Performance Plan

No change was made from the fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan.

We have learned that, without exception, political will from the top is imperative for reforming national-level institutions such as parliaments and judiciaries.

PERFORMANCE GOAL 4: POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN POSTCONFLICT SITUATIONS INCREASED

This performance goal (see table 6.6) relates to postconflict transition countries. Since promoting political, social, and economic freedom is an overarching goal, multifaceted programs emphasizing conflict prevention, mitigation, and postconflict reconstruction and rehabilitation are undertaken. It is not feasible to have indicators that directly measure the diverse programs tailored to the needs and targets of the Annual Performance Plan in each country.

Performance Analysis

The overall Freedom House Index verifies that significant improvements have been made (but didn't exceed the targets) in three of USAID's four geographic regions. Those gains contribute to the overall enhancement in the score in Agency-assisted postconflict countries.

In sub-Saharan Africa the fiscal year 1998 scores improved in **Sierra Leone** and **Liberia**. The Europe and Eurasia region shows improvement in scores for **Azerbaijan** and **Bosnia-Herzegovina**. In Latin America and the Caribbean, **El Salvador** and

Nicaragua had improved scores. (See chapter 2, "Build Sustainable Democracies," for discussion of changes in country scores.)

Asia and the Near East reflected no changes in scores from 1995 through 1998 in the countries originally chosen for monitoring. But it should be noted that there are no USAID programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. (See also chapter 2 of this document, on democracy and good governance.)

Achievement Beyond Fiscal Year 1999 Plan Levels

There is nothing to report.

Planned Actions for Unmet Fiscal Year 1999 Targets

The most significant issue related to democracy in the **Asia and Near East** country programs concerns political will. We have learned that, without exception, political will from the top is imperative for reforming national-level institutions such as parliaments and judiciaries. The difficulty, however, is in

translating local results upward and into the national policymaking arena. The bureau is attempting to understand this process better. Many ANE democracy and governance programs are restricted to smaller geographic areas or are in fields that do not directly influence political rights or civil liberties, such as NGO capacity building or legislative drafting.

This issue of political will exists in all the Agency's regions. We have proposed *supplementing* the performance goal of Freedom House scores with indicators that reflect the direct effects of our programs. This is particularly important

because desired results in democracy and governance in postconflict countries often are beyond our resource scope and manageable interest. This proposal is reflected in the fiscal year 2001 Annual Performance Plan.

Revisions to the Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan

In the fiscal year 2000 Annual Performance Plan, Heritage Foundation scores were added to the measures used in categorizing and tracking conflict-prone transition countries.

Performance Table From Fiscal Year 1999 Annual Performance Plan

Table 6.6. Performance Goal 4: Political Rights and Civil Liberties In Postconflict Situations Increased

Indicator: Change in the number of countries designated *postconflict* that are classified as free/partly free/not free.

Source: Freedom House.

		APP Baseline(1) 1995	Latest Actual (2) 1998	Target (3) 1999
Agency Level	planned			2/9/3
	actual	0/7/13	2/9/10	
sub-Saharan Africa	planned			1/4/3
	actual	0/0/7	0/2/5	
Asia – Near East	planned			0/1/4
	actual	0/1/3	0/1/4	
Europe – Eurasia	planned			0/5/0
	actual	0/2/3	0/4/1	
Latin America – Caribbean	planned			1/3/0
	actual	0/4/0	2/2/0	

Note: Number sequence above is free/ partly free/ not free.

1. The baseline uses the actual countries tracked (see FY99 list within each regional designation), and the Freedom House scores in this column represent scores from 1995. It was revised from FY99 APP because Freedom House information is not yet available for fiscal year 1999; we cannot report FY99 scores but can show context indications on the FY98 listing from 1998 Freedom House scores.

2. The actuals represent country status for 1998, as expressed in *Freedom in the World, 1998–99*.

3. The 1999 target represents expected performance based on observable trends, over a period ending in 1999 and beginning after the baseline year.

Adjustments to Be Included In the Fiscal Year 2001 Annual Performance Plan

Heritage Foundation scores are no longer being tracked, though they were initially presented as an indicator in the FY00 Annual Performance Plan, because coverage was not always sufficiently complete to meet Agency needs for this goal. The Freedom House scores are being retained because they present trend data, valuable in assessing the status of transition countries.

However, they do not represent the full programming picture.

The Agency will begin experimenting with supplementing Freedom House scores with indicators and measurement tools currently being used (i.e., the NGO sustainability index). Democracy and governance performance measures being developed at the country level for postconflict and crisis environments (see chapter 2 for a full discussion) will also be useful tools for tracking trends, supplementing the Freedom House reporting.

Notes

¹United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Emergency and Humanitarian Assistance/World Health Organization.

²Ibid.

³Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance R4, fiscal year 1998 results.

⁴Humanitarian Assistance Goal Review, 1999.

⁵Office of Food for Peace/Emergency Response Division R4, fiscal year 1998 results.

⁶Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance R4, fiscal year 1998 results.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean Highlights, Performance Accomplishments, and Nonperformance Factor Review.

⁹Office of Transition Initiatives R4, fiscal year 1998 results.

¹⁰Office of Food for Peace/Emergency Response Division R4, fiscal year 1998 results.

¹¹Bureau for Africa Program (Goal) Review fiscal year 2001; Office of Food for Peace/Emergency Response Division R4, fiscal year 1998; Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Results Review, fiscal year 1998.

¹²*The World Disasters Report* 1999.

¹³In stable communities, where the population size and the number of deaths are known, the calculation of crude mortality rate is straightforward, and the rate calculated is relatively reliable. But in situations where neither of these variables is available, several other methods are employed, such as monitoring cemetery burials. Collecting crude mortality rate data by using short time periods and small sampling frames may give unreliable results.

¹⁴Fiscal year 1999 Annual Performance Plan.

